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PUPPET MASTERS OR MARIONETES: IS PROGRAM
TRADING MANIPULATIVE AS DEFINED BY THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934?
LAWRENCE DAMIAN MCCABE
INTRODUCTION
Gould did it.' Fisk did it.2 Joe Kennedy did it.3 The Hunt brothers
tried to do it.4 Market manipulation, as well as attempts to limit its dele-
terious effects, has a long history in the commodities, securities, and fu-
tures markets both in the United States and abroad.5 Historically, as
new investment instruments are introduced into the markets, individuals
found ways to use those instruments to manipulate the markets.6 Conse-
quently, when program trading' was introduced into the markets in the
early 1980s, those acquainted with the securities industry asked: Is pro-
gram trading manipulative per seI or is the practice simply the target of
1. Jay Gould, with Fisk as his partner, participated in one of the "most audacious
speculations yet witnessed in Wall Street: an attempt to corner... entire, the gold supply
of the nation." Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices--The
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 Yale J. Reg. 281, 289 & n.28 (1991) (quoting Maury Klein, The
Life and Legend of Jay Gould 99-115 (1986)) (covering a general history of anti-manipu-
lation legislation and the actions leading up to the criminalization of manipulation and
the effectiveness of the legislation on commodities futures manipulation).
2. See ad at 289.
3. Before taking the helm of the SEC, Joseph Kennedy was a known "pool opera-
tor." Although not illegal when Kennedy participated in the pools, one of the main
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the eradication of pools. See
Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal 179-80 (1970) (giving a
general history of the '34 Act and the personalities and political and economic philoso-
phies of its authors). For a discussion of "pools," see infra notes 196-202 and accompa-
nying text.
4. See Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 332, 334-36, 340
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (relating the events of 1979-1980, when silver prices rose from S9 an
ounce to $50; on a motion to dismiss a claim, the court requested that an amended claim
be entered to show fraud by the trading defendants while dismissing the claim against
Commodity Exchange, Inc. and the Chicago Board of Trade); see also Markham, supra
note 1, at 343-46 (noting the disastrous attempt of the Hunt brothers to "corner" the
silver market in the 1970s and the economic collapse of the silver market when the broth-
ers failed).
5. See 1 John R. Dos Passos, A Treatise on The Law of Stock-Brokers and Stock-
Exchanges 615-47 (2d ed. 1905) (tracking the history of anti-manipulative measures from
the Lex Romana to the New York Penal Code at the turn of this century); Markham,
supra note 1, at at 288; M. Van Smith, Preventing the Manipulation of Commodity Fu-
tures Market" To Deliver or Not to Deliver?, 32 Hastings L.J. 1569, 1571-73 (1981) (dat-
ing the attempts to control commodity manipulation to the ancient Romans and Greeks).
6. See 1 Dos Passos, supra note 5, at 644-47; Van Smith, supra note 5, at 1571-73.
7. Program trading is defined by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. "as any trad-
ing strategy involving the related purchase or sale of a 'Basket' or group of 15 or more
stocks having a total market value of $1 million or more." New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., The Official Constitution and Rules of the New York Stock Exchange Inc. 2080a,
Rule 80(A)(C)(i), at 2656 (1990). Part I of this Note will define program trading in more
detail as well as the most famous (or perhaps infamous) type: index arbitrage.
8. See Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices
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modem-day Luddites9 who fear computers?' °
Although program trading has provoked considerable controversy
since its introduction in 1982,11 the stock market crash of 1987 triggered
the most criticism. 2 On "Black Monday," October 19, 1987, the equi-
ties markets suffered their greatest financial setback since the 1929
crash. 3 The Dow Jones Industrial Average ("DJIA") lost over twenty
percent of its value in a single day of trading, dropping 508 points. 14 The
presidential task force assigned to study the causes of the 1987 crash
stated that, although not solely to blame for the markets' dysfunction,
program trading and its close cousin, portfolio insurance, were signifi-
cant contributing factors to the 1987 crash. 5 Since 1987, Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), Commodities Futures
and the Text of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 359,
429 (program trading "is fairly characterized as manipulative, and accordingly section
10(b) should be understood to forbid its use or employment").
9. A Luddite is any person who fears that new technology will economically harm
him and seeks to destroy it. Luddite is derived from the name given to English artisans
who, in 1811 and 1812, rioted and destroyed newly introduced machinery that would
deprive them of employment and wages. Although dealt with harshly in Great Britain
(execution), the movement spread to the Continent and caused major labor upheavals in
France and Germany. The term is said to be derived from a mental incompetent named
Ned Lud. See 3 Nationalism, Industrialization, and Democracy 1815-1914: A Docu-
mentary History of Modem Europe 66-72 (Thomas G. Barnes & Gerald D. Feldman
eds., 1981).
10. See Lester G. Telser, October 1987 and the Structure of Financial Markets: An
Exorcism of Demons, in Black Monday and the Future of Financial Markets 101, 108
(Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. et a. eds., 1989) ("Effective program trading uses computers.
The public fears computers. Neither computers nor program trading deserve blame for
the Crash.").
11. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
12. See Letter To The Editor, Alan C. "Ace" Greenburg, How to Reduce Stock Mar-
ket Injury Potential, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989, at A30 (the Chairman and CEO of Bear
Steams & Co. replying to what he characterized as the "deluge of negative publicity
about program trading"); Stefan Fatsis, Pioneers Firm in Defense Of Program Trades,
Chi. Trib., Dec. 24, 1989, at 9B (discussing the two originators of index option arbitrage,
defending their position from what they referred to as "media hype").
13. See Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, Report on 1987 Market
Crash 1 (1988) [hereinafter Brady Report]. The task force also made a lengthy study
comparing the 1929 and 1987 crashes. See id. at VIII-1 to VIII-10. The task force ex-
amined the effects of the 1929 crash on the economy and found that it did not cause the
Great Depression. It was further noted that the U.S. economy has gone through vast
structural changes since 1929 which have made it more stable. See id. at VIII-10. Based
on these two findings, the task force believed that the 1987 crash would not lead to an
economic contraction comparable to the Great Depression. See id. at VIII-10.
14. See id. at 1.
15. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at v. The report further concluded that the best
means to protect against future crashes would be to create a single regulatory body to
watch over all the markets. See id. at 60-63, 69; see also Division of Mkt. Regulation,
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, The October 1987 Market Break 3-11 (1988) [hereinafter SEC
Crash Report] (finding that although not the sole cause of the crash, "the existence of
futures on stock indexes and the use of various strategies involving 'program trading' ...
were a significant factor in accelerating and exacerbating the declines"); United States
Gen. Accounting Office, Stock Market Crash of October 1987, Preliminary Report to
Congress 6 (1988), reprinted in 322 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) pt. II (Feb. 9, 1988)
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Trading Commission ("CFTC"), and the relevant Self-Regulatory Orga-
nizations16 ("SROs") have all attempted to regulate the effects of pro-
gram trading. 1 7
[hereinafter GAO Report] (stating that both the actual and anticipated activities of pro-
gram traders contributed to the crash).
There are conflicting perceptions of program trading's role in the crash. "One money
manager said that arbitrage was responsible for 200 to 250 points of the October 19 stock
market decline ... others... believed [program trading] accelerated the speed, or com-
pressed the time frame of the plunge." Id at 45. But see SEC Economist Sees No Link
On OcL 19 Between Program Trading, Price Declines, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 691
(May 12, 1989); Gramm Says SEC Crash Report Selectively Omitted Key Data, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1013, 1014 (July 6, 1990) (Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion ("CFTC") Chairman criticizes the findings that index-related trading added to or
was a significant factor in the 1987 crash); Richard Roll, The International Crash of
October 1987, in Black Monday and the Future of Financial Markets 35 (Robert W.
Kamphuis, Jr. et al. eds., 1989) (arguing that the 1987 Crash was a result of the interna-
tional markets which started to drop before the U.S. markets and argues that the nations
with index arbitrage fared better than those without it). One commentator has character-
ized the Brady Report as "inane... when viewed as a public-interest document... [and]
blatant[ly] socially harmful ... if ... viewed otherwise." David D. Haddock, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Brady Report: Public Interest Special Interest, or Rent Extraction?,
74 Cornell L. Rev. 841, 864 (1989).
16. The Self-Regulatory Organizations are those bodies that establish the rules for
each exchange. The two best known SROs are the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). The SROs create rules and
regulations that are submitted to the SEC for approval. The exchanges then police their
own members for violations of both their own rules and the '34 Act. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1988).
17. Congress enacted the Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, 104 Stat.
963 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78i (Supp. I 1990)) (amending § 9(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 granting the SEC power over index-related trading dur-
ing times of great market volatility). In relevant part, the Act set forth as follows:
(h) Limitations on practices that affect market volatility
[T]he Commission may adopt, consistent with the public interest, the protection
of investors, and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets-
(1) to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent manipulation of price
levels of the equity securities market.... AND
(2) to prohibit or constrain, during periods of extraordinary market volatility,
any trading practice in connection with the purchase or sale of equity securities
that the Commission determines (A) has previously contributed significantly to
extraordinary levels of volatility that have threatened the maintenance of fair
and orderly markets; and (B) is reasonably certain to engender such levels of
volatility if not prohibited or constrained.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(h) (Supp. 111990); see also SEC Makes Permanent NYSE Rule Curbing
Index Arbitrage When DJIA Moves 50 Pts, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1553, 1553-54
(Oct. 25, 1991) (approving Rule 80A of the NYSE, discussed infra); CFTC Staff To De-
velop Automated Procedure to Identify Arbitrage Trades, 20 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
854 (June 3, 1988) (coding tickets to be able to gain more information about intra-day
trading, aiding in the enforcement of exchange rules, the CEA, and in private party arbi-
trations); Memorandum From Agnes M. Gautier, Vice President, Market Surveillance
Bureau, NYSE, Information Memo, No. 90-1 to All Member Organizations regarding
Daily Filing of Program Trading (Jan. 5, 1990) (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
(requiring large traders to report their activity to the NYSE on a regular basis); New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., The Official Constitution and Rules of the New York Stock
Exchange Inc. 2080a, Rule 80(A)(C)(i), at 2656 (1990) (limiting index trading on days
when the market moves 50 points in any direction to only stabilizing purchases and
1993] S209
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This Note examines the issue of market manipulation in regard to pro-
gram trading. In particular, this Note addresses whether program trad-
ing can be considered as manipulative per se under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (" '34 Act"). Part I provides the background and
definition of the main forms of program trading-index arbitrage and
portfolio insurance. Part II examines the definition of manipulation
under sections 9(a) and 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule lOb-5. Part III
addresses whether index arbitrage and portfolio insurance are manipula-
tive per se under the '34 Act in light of the discussions in Parts I and II.
This Note concludes that, although the Supreme Court's current defini-
tion of manipulation eliminates this question, the history and purpose of
the '34 Act supports the conclusion that program trading is manipulative
per se and thereby should be prohibited by Congress.
I. BACKGROUND OF PROGRAM TRADING
A. The Origins of Index Futures Trading
When deciding whether program trading is manipulative, one must
first understand the origins of program trading. In the late
1970s, the futures exchanges began a search for new products to
attract investors.18 They had begun trading in futures based on debt
instruments 9 and foreign currencies earlier in the decade and
were seeking new avenues for investment.20 As a result of this search,
the Kansas City Board of Trade ("KCBT"), in October of 1977,
sought permission from the CFTC to trade index-based 2 futures con-
sales); Intermarket Trading Restrictions, File No. SR-NYSE-88-34, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-26279, 42 S.E.C. Docket 304 (Nov. 14, 1988) (interpreting frontrunning as
including the trading in index futures immediately before the execution of a basket order
knowing that the basket order may impact favorably on the underlying index). The inter-
pretation was approved eight months latter. See 44 S.E.C. Docket 25 (July 19, 1989).
18. See Neil S. Weiner, Stock Index Futures: A Guide for Traders, Investors, and
Analysts 92-93 (1984).
19. The futures exchanges originally based their new contracts on Treasury notes and
"T-Bills." See id. A Treasury note is defined as an "obligation of the federal govern-
ment, with a maturity of one to ten years on which interest is paid by coupon." Black's
Law Dictionary 1502 (6th ed. 1990). A Treasury or "T-Bill" is defined as a "[sihort term
obligations of the federal government .... for specified terms of three, six and twelve
months." Id. at 1501.
20. See Lee A. Pickard & Judith W. Axe, The History and Mechanics of Index Fu-
tures and Program Trading, in Trading Practices, The Portfolio Execution Process, and
Soft Dollar Practices 1990, at 83, 85, 87 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 684, 1990) (noting that futures based on financial instruments began trading in
1972).
21. An index measures the performance of a particular group of stocks. Perhaps the
most widely recognized index is the Dow Jones Industrial Average ("DJIA"). See Wei-
ner, supra note 18, at 37-39; Max G. Ansbacher, The New Stock Index Market: Strate-
gies for Profit in Stock Index Futures and Options 6-7 (1983). The DJIA measures the
average price movements of 30 large capitalized industrial stocks, also known as blue
chips. See id. The DJIA is an unweighted measure. See id. Each stock is treated equally
in arriving at the average, with no special weight being given for the stock's capitaliza-
tion. See id. For example, if there were only three stocks in the DJIA, stock A with a
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tracts. 2 Because of jurisdictional disputes between the SEC and CFTC"
as well as concomitant litigation,24 trading in index futures"5 did not start
until 1982.
After the CFTC and the SEC entered into a jurisdictional accord, and
the litigation problems settled, the KCBT initiated trading in Value Line
price of $15, stock B with a price of $10, and stock C with a price of S5, the DJIA would
reflect an average value of $10 [(15 + 10 + 5)/3 = 30/3 = 10]. See Weiner, supra note
18, at 37; Ansbacher, supra, at 7. There are no index futures contracts based on the
DJIA.
The Standard & Poor's 500 ("S&P 500") is a weighted measure of 500 securities that
cover a variety of different sectors (industrials, financial services, public utilities, and
transportation companies) on the NYSE, American Stock Exchange, Inc. ("AMEX"),
and in the over-the-counter market. See Ansbacher, supra, at 7-8. Each security in the
S&P 500 is weighted by its capitalization. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 39-42. An index
weighted by capitalization recognizes that some stocks are more widely held than others.
Accordingly, the S&P 500 multiplies the shares outstanding for each stock by its price
before dividing by the number of stocks that make up the index. See Ansbacher, supra, at
8. Other indices include the NYSE Index (similar to the S&P 500 index except that it
uses all the stocks traded on the NYSE), the Major Market Index (AMEX) (a price-
weighted index of 20 blue chip stocks), and the CBOE-100 Index (a price-weighted index
of 100 stocks that have listed options). See id at 8-12. The most complex index is the
Value Line Composite Average ("VLCA"). See id. at 9. The VLCA weighs each of its
over 1700 stocks equally. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 44. In contrast to the above
arithmetically averaged indices, the VLCA averages it securities geometrically. See id.
"The virtue of geometric averaging is that it preserves the integrity of successive upward
and downward percentage changes. 'Arithmetic mean bias' creeps in otherwise." Id. at
45.
22. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 92.
23. An initial regulatory difficulty was deciding whether the SEC or the CFTC hadjurisdiction over the index futures. This conflict was solved by an accord between the
SEC and the CFTC granting exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC. See Futures Trading
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 3887 (amending 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (1988)).
24. The early litigation problems were centered on copyright issues and exclusivity
contracts. See, eg., Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 538 F. Supp.
1063, 1071 (S.D.N.Y.) (granting an injunction against the exchange's use of the S&P 500
as a basis for an index-related futures contract), afid, 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982); Dow
Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 113, 122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(denying a similar injunction).
25. An index future is a derivative product. See William E. Nix & Susan W. Nix, The
Dow Jones-Irwin Guide to Stock Index Futures and Options 4, 11 (1984). The future
creates a binding contract to purchase or sell the underlying commodity at a predeter-
mined price on a predetermined date. See id. at 11. The difference between index futures
and other commodities futures is the lack of a cash market in the underlying product.
See Brady Report, supra note 13, at VI-18, VI-18 to VI-19. For example, a futures con-
tract based on soybeans has the soybean cash (spot) market from which to buy or sell the
soybeans in order to fulfill the contracted future delivery. Conversely, there is no cash
market for indexes. Rather, the securities exchanges, such as the NYSE or AMEX, act
as cash markets for the equities that make up the index. See id. This raises the question
of whether index futures should be called derivative or derivative of a derivative. See id.
By law there can be no futures contracts on individual securities. See Commodities Ex-
change Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2a(v) (1988) ("[n]o person shall offer to enter into, enter into, or
confirm the execution of any contract of sale (or option on such contract) for future
delivery of any security, or interest therein or based on the value thereof"). Oddly, the
only other product from which the futures markets are barred from making contracts is
onions. See id. § 13-1.
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Composite Index futures on February 16, 1982.26 The Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange ("CME") quickly followed suit with a futures contract
based on the S&P 500 index in April of that year.27 The New York
Futures Exchange ("NYFE") introduced its futures contract based on
the NYSE Composite Index on May 6, 1982.28
As a result of the debate over the utility of index futures, the SEC
formulated three policy reasons for the establishment of index-related
trading: (1) faster transmission of macroeconomic information from the
more sensitive futures markets to the equities markets (creating a more
efficient pricing structure for equities);29 (2) hedging opportunities for
large position owners (e.g., portfolio and pension account managers);30
and (3) price discovery31 opportunities.32
The structure of the futures market, as envisioned by the SEC, under-
pinned the policy reasons. Initially the index futures market was seen as
having three tiers of participants. Speculators, hedgers, and arbitrageurs
would make up the market.3 a The speculators would take extraordinary
risks, betting on the stock market's overall performance, and drive the
futures market in one direction.34 The hedgers, seeking to preserve their
stock portfolios against market shifts, would drive the market in the op-
posite direction.35 Finally, arbitrageurs would seek to profit from the
price gaps that the hedgers and speculators caused between the futures
and equities markets. 36 With the largest hedgers, portfolio insurers, flee-
ing the futures market,37 the question arises whether speculators are con-
trolling the futures markets rather than simply constituting an integral
part of the three-tiered system. As will be discussed in Part III, due to
the flight of the hedgers and the possibly de minimis increase in efficiency
26. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 93.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient An Economic Analysis
of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 630-31, 707
(1988) (citing the SEC's defense of the information transfer and comparing it to the argu-
ments used by insider traders).
30. See id.
31. Price discovery is technique that uses the futures market to establish a portfolio,
thus making later entry into the equity markets easier. "[L]onger term investors often
find it faster and initially cheaper to initiate portfolio position changes through the fu-
tures market. Eventually, the futures position is replaced with stocks." Brady Report,
supra note 13, at 7.
32. See Stout, supra note 29, at 630-31. Moreover, the second and third leg of the
SEC's policy grounds reflect a desire to attract and maintain greater institutional involve-
ment in the equities markets. See SEC Crash Report, supra note 15, at 3-1 to 3-5.
33. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 87-89; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d
1154, 1158 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
34. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 87 (discussing the roles of hedgers and speculators);
Ansbacher, supra note 21, at 42 (discussing the role of arbitrageurs).
35. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 87.
36. See Ansbacher, supra note 21, at 42.
37. See Stout, supra note 29, at 707.
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in the information transfer,33 these policy reasons may no longer be
compelling.
Although policy reasons existed for the creation of index futures con-
tracts and the three-tiered system appeared structurally sound, Congress
expressed concern over whether index futures contracts could be
manipulated or, alternatively, be used indirectly to manipulate the equi-
ties markets.3 9 Congress recognized the problematic nature of index fu-
tures when it created The Futures Trading Act of 1982 ("FTA") °
codifying the jurisdictional accord between the SEC and CFTC. Section
2 of the FTA grants the SEC veto authority over any new index contract
created on or after December 9, 1982." This grant of authority sought
to prevent manipulation of the securities markets, while granting the
CFTC day-to-day exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading. 2
38. See id. at 631-32, 707 (noting that the use of index futures as a hedge has dramati-
cally shrunk since the crash of 1987; and questioning whether the few minutes or hours
that the transfer of information to the securities markets from the futures markets saves is
efficient enough to condone the massive shift in pricing).
39. See Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Fu-
tures Trading Act of 1982, at 39 (Comm. Print 1983):
(6) APPROVAL OF FUTURES CONTRACTS-PUBLIC INTEREST
TEST:
The House bill provides that, in determining whether to approve a new futures
contract for trading, the Commission [SEC] must consider, among other things,
the extent to which trading of the new contract is likely to divert investment
capital from capital formation and to cause price manipulation and destabiliza-
tion in the commodity forming the basis for the new contract.
See also Linda N. Edwards & Franklin R. Edwards, A Legal and Economic Analysis of
Manipulation in Futures Markets, 4 J. Futures Markets 332, 361 (1984) (a general back-
ground on the regulatory history of index futures contracts).
40. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 101, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983)
(amending 7 U.S.C. § 2).
41. See id. § 2(a)(iv)(1). The effective date foreclosed on the SEC's input or veto of
the above discussed futures contracts because their application preceded the jurisdictional
accord.
42. In relevant part, § 2(a) states as follows:
(ii) This Chapter shall apply to and the Commission [CFTC] shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction with respect to ... contracts of sale (or options on such con-
tracts) for future delivery of a group or index of securities (or any interest
therein or based upon the value thereof): Provided, however, That no board of
trade shall be designated as a contract market with respect to any such con-
tracts of sale.., for future delivery the board of trade making such application
demonstrates and the Commission [CFTC] expressly finds that the specific con-
tract... meets the following minimum requirements:
(II) Trading in such contract... shall not be readily susceptible to manipula-
tion of the price of such contract ... nor to causing or being used in the manip-
ulation of the price of any underlying security, option on such security or option
on a group or index including such securities; and
(iv)(II) ... The Commission [CFTC] shall not approve any such application if
the Securities and Exchange Commission determines that such contract. . . fails
to meet the minimum requirements set forth in clause (ii) of this subparagraph.
Id. § 2a.
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With Congress's dictate in mind, the SEC took measures to prevent
overt manipulative activity in the use of indices, but has yet to define the
indices as per se manipulative. Rather, it has approached index futures
as products that can and should be controlled by regulation.4 a Specifi-
cally, the SEC has set forth five requirements that every index futures
contract must meet in order to escape its veto." The requirements are
based on the congressional mandate in section 2(a)(III) of the FTA.4
First, there must be at least twenty-five issuers in the particular index.46
The reasoning behind this is that the more stocks present, the more diffi-
cult and expensive it would be to manipulate the market.47 Second, the
aggregate capitalization of the underlying stocks must be at least $75
billion.48 The higher the capitalization of the underlying stocks, the
more expensive the stocks' prices are and the more costly they are to
manipulate.49 Third, the depth and liquidity of the stocks that make up
the index futures contract must be able to support the index.50 The
greater the market's depth, the less likely the market itself will be moved
too greatly by the index traders.51 Fourth, the contract must fulfill a
diversity requirement. Rather than allowing a single industry to bear the
brunt of program trading, the risk of index trading is spread among vari-
ous industries and issuers. 52 Finally, the SEC examines the way that
each index that a contract is based on weighs (values) the underlying
securities.5 3 This "weight test" supposedly protects the index futures
contract itself from manipulation by sharp operators using unevenly
43. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-29854, File No. SR-NYSE-91-21, 49
S.E.C. Docket 1722 (Oct. 24, 1991) (approving the NYSE's Rule 80A establishing "tick-
rules" allowing for only stabilizing transactions (i.e., program traders can only execute
buy orders when the market is down from the previous close and sell orders when the
market is up from the previous close) on all program trading when the market (as mea-
sured by the DJIA) moves 50 points up or down).
44. See Designation Criteria for Futures Contracts and Options, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-20578, 29 S.E.C. Docket 817, 819-20 (Jan. 18, 1984) [hereinafter SEC
Designation Criteria] (stating the guidelines as well as the reasoning behind the guide-
lines); Edwards & Edwards, supra note 39, at 361.
45. Section 2a(ii)(III) states in relevant part, "[s]uch group or index of securities
shall be predominately composed of the securities of unaffiliated issuers and shall be a
widely published measure of, and shall reflect, the market for all publicly traded equity or
debt securities or a substantial segment thereof, or shall be comparable to such measure."
7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii)(III) (1988).
46. See SEC Designation Criteria, supra note 44, at 819.
47. See Edwards & Edwards, supra note 39, at 361.
48. See SEC Designation Criteria, supra note 44, at 819-20.
49. See Edwards & Edwards, supra note 39, at 361.
50. See SEC Designation Criteria, supra note 44, at 820.
51. See Edwards & Edwards, supra note 39, at 361.
52. See SEC Designation Criteria, supra note 44, at 820; Edwards & Edwards, supra
note 39, at 361.
53. See SEC Designation Criteria, supra note 44, at 820; Edwards & Edwards, supra
note 39, at 361.
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weighted securities to affect the market with minimal investment.'
Adhering to these requirements, the SEC has objected to several index
futures contracts.-" Perhaps the most telling was the SEC's objection to
the Standard & Poor's Financial Index. 6 The SEC found that, because
the index failed to meet any of the foregoing requirements, there was a
"substantial risk the index could be used in manipulative schemes.""7
For instance, the index had a limited capitalization of $65.8 billion dol-
lars, was dominated by five securities, and was made up of only 40 thinly-
traded5" securities.5 9 Notwithstanding these requirements, the SEC has
approved a number of futures contracts. 6°
For futures contracts to be used successfully, trading strategies had to
be created to encompass both the futures and equities markets. Two pre-
dominant strategies that appeared were index arbitrage and portfolio in-
surance. Although both strategies have been lumped together under the
heading "program trading," they each serve different functions. The fol-
lowing section defines each strategy and explains the respective roles of
the strategies in the marketplace.
54. See SEC Designation Criteria, supra note 44, at 820; Edwards & Edwards, supra
note 39, at 361.
The SEC's current criteria for protecting the market from manipulation by index fu-
tures oddly match the criteria necessary to engage in manipulation propounded by Pro-
fessor Dice, a commentator on the securities exchanges before the 1929 crash. See
Charles A. Dice, The Stock Market 415, 416-18 (1926).
A manipulator, as Professor Dice states in his section on conditions favoring manipula-
tion, is more likely to seek liquid, large capitalized stocks. Dice's theory has two prem-
ises. First, the smaller the float, the more expensive it is to compile a large enough
position to profit from a manipulative transaction. See id. The inherent illiquidity of
small float stocks means that the prices rise rapidly whenever a large block purchase
occurs. See id Moreover, any attempt to manipulate a small float stock would immedi-
ately be noticed by other experienced traders, who would then join in on the manipula-
tion. See iL Second, a stock with a small float is difficult to sell out of position because of
its intrinsic illiquidity. See id
55. See, eg., Edwards & Edwards, supra note 39, at 362 (outlining several early SEC
rejections of future contracts).
56. See id
57. Id (quoting Letter from George Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC, to David Homer,
Director, Division of Economics and Education, CFTC, at 9 (Nov. 29, 1983)).
58. See id The top 10 stocks traded on average about 170,000 shares daily. See id.
59. Because the SEC used different, and easier, standards to approve index options, a
type of product over which it has complete jurisdiction, it has been accused of favoritism.
See, eg., Approval of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Listing of Options on the
CBOE Biotech Index, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31243, 52 S.E.C. Docket 1661 (Sept.
28, 1992) (approving an index-related option where the index's total market capitaliza-
tion was $19 billion and consisted of 20 stocks, five of which constituted 50% of the
index's value). But on the other hand, options, being optional, are less likely to impact on
the market. How many options will actually be exercised? Even if exercised, only naked
calls and puts will require resort to the spot market (and most will be bought out/
covered).
60. The SEC recently approved an index futures contract based on the Major Market
Index of "20 heavily capitalized, blue-chip stocks from eight separate industries." Chi-
cago Board of Trade, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 226340, at *1, *3 (Sept. 24, 1991).
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B. Two Types of Program Trading: Index Arbitrage and
Portfolio Insurance
Since the inception of index futures and index options trading, inves-
tors have sought a means to use these derivative instruments to imple-
ment trading strategies that encompass both the securities markets and
the derivative markets.61 The best known (and perhaps least understood)
of these strategies is program trading. Program trading is not a mono-
lithic strategy, but rather encompasses several distinct trading strate-
gies.62 The focus of this Note will be on the two predominate program
trading strategies: index arbitrage and portfolio insurance.
1. Index Arbitrage
Index arbitrage is a trading strategy that takes advantage of differences
in value between the underlying securities (also known as the "basket")
and either index-related options or futures to lock in differentials that
assure minimum profits.63 In order to implement the arbitrage, the arbi-
trageur must initiate either a sell or a buy program. A sell program,
based on trigger information, simultaneously sells the underlying securi-
ties and buys the index options or futures." A buy program simultane-
ously buys the underlying securities and sells index options or futures.65
Index arbitrage is deemed by some market analysts to make the mar-
ket more efficient.66 While the individual arbitrageur profits, the futures
markets' inherent sensitivity to economic news creates a more efficient
market.67 Due to the relative inefficiency in the equities market, the arbi-
trageurs correct the pricing errors of the specialists68 and market mak-
61. See Ansbacher, supra note 21, at 95-100; Weiner, supra note 18, at 106-34; Pick-
ard & Axe, supra note 20, at 88 (noting that within two years of the creation of index
futures, 40 of the top 200 pension fund and portfolio managers (by portfolio size) were
participating in the index futures market).
62. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at 6-7.
63. See Ansbacher, supra note 21, at 44-45.
64. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at 6.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., Dean Furbush & Annette Poulsen, Harmonizing Margins: The Regula-
tion of Margin Levels in Stock Index Futures Markets, 74 Cornell L. Rev, 873, 887-89
(1989) (arguing that the proposed regulations on index futures contracts would have little
or no effect on stock market volatility); Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short
Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock
Market Crash, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 799, 825 (1989) (arguing that portfolio insurance and
index arbitrage had no impact on the crash).
67. See Furbush & Poulsen, supra note 66, at 889-90; Macey et al., supra note 66, at
831-32.
68. Specialists have three roles on the floor of the NYSE. They act as brokers, deal-
ers, and auctioneers. Specialists act like brokers when members drop "limit orders" at
the posts; specialists then execute the orders when their prices are in market range. Spe-
cialists act like dealers when they purchase and sell stocks for their own accounts. Spe-
cialists act like auctioneers when they set the opening prices which clear the accumulated
orders. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at VI-5.
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ers6 9 in equities. 7a Essentially, the arbitrageur levels the discrepancy
between prices on the stock exchange and on the futures exchange and
speeds the stock exchanges' reaction to economic information and
news.
71
Although there is little or no argument that index arbitrage decreases
reaction time, program trading does have negative side effects. The first
noticed, and perhaps unanticipated, effect of index arbitrage is the trans-
fer of selling pressure from the futures exchanges to the stock markets.'
For example, if index arbitrageurs notice that stock prices are trading at
a premium to a particular index, they will initiate sell programs. The
purchase and sale has the effect of lowering the prices of the equities
while raising the prices of the index future. 3 The transfer of selling pres-
sure is often read by individual investors as a lack of confidence in the
overall market.74 As a result, individual investors join in the selling,
causing a downward spike in the market's prices. This, in turn, may
trigger further index arbitrages.75 One commentator has referred to this
spiking effect as the "tail wagging the dog."7 6
On the other side of the futures market are the hedgers, those portfolio
and pension fund managers who seek to protect their equity holdings
from sudden market shifts. Before the introduction of index futures and
options, hedging usually consisted of asset reallocation. 7 With index fu-
tures introduced to the mix of products available for hedging, new strate-
gies needed to be created. Many fund managers turned to "portfolio
insurance" to implement the futures-based hedge.
2. Portfolio Insurance
Portfolio insurance uses computer generated models to compute the
optimum stock-to-cash ratios of particular equity holdings. The insur-
ers78 use index futures contracts or options to correct and hedge their
69. A market maker is a dealer who, with the approval of the National Association
Of Securities Dealers, Inc., trades in a specific stock for his own or the firm's account.
See id at VI-12.
70. See Furbush & Poulsen, supra note 66, at 889-90; Macey et al., supra note 66, at
831-32.
71. See Furbush & Poulsen, supra note 66, at 889-90; Macey et al., supra note 66, at
831-32; Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987. A Legal and Public
Policy Analysis, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 191, 213-14 (1988).
72. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at 42.
73. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 71, at 214.
74. See id Moreover, some commentators blame this spiking effect for the flight of
individual investors from the market. See Kathleen Kerwin, Is the Tail Wagging the
Dog?: Sizing up the Impact of Stock-Index Futures on the Market, Barron's, Dec. 10,
1984, at 40.
75. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 71, at 214.
76. Kerwin, supra note 74, at 11.
77. See Pickard & Axe, supra note 20, at 90. Asset allocation is the shifting percent-
ages of the portfolio back and forth from stocks to bonds as the markets shift.
78. The use of this hedging device produced a number of firms that specialized in
managing the trading for institutional fund managers. See Allan Sloan & Richard L.
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institutional clients' security positions.7 9 Similar to index arbitrage, per-
ceived value differentials between stocks and futures trigger the pro-
gram's activity80 as the portfolio managers attempt to reallocate assets
before they are hit by a stock market decline."' Portfolio insurance is a
purely reactionary strategy. As the stock portfolio loses value in com-
parison to the index futures, the insurance mechanism is triggered.82 At
this point, a manager fearing losses will sell index futures or options to
avoid taking a bath in the securities market."' Portfolio insurance can
only achieve its goals if it meets two prerequisites: (i) the disciplined
selling (or buying) of futures contracts at trigger points in a declining
market; and (ii) the presence of liquid futures markets.84
While portfolio insurance appeared attractive as a hedging device, it
often fell short of its supporters' predictions of protection. After Black
Monday, it became common knowledge on Wall Street that whoever
pulls the trigger first may be the only one insured. 85 Subsequently, be-
cause the "insurance" proved so inadequate on Black Monday and on
the days that followed, many, if not most, of the portfolio managers have
left the futures market.86 Moreover, as in the case of index arbitrage,
portfolio insurance led to the transference of selling pressure from the
futures to the securities markets.8 7 On the Friday before Black Monday,
portfolio insurers were responsible for approximately $2.1 billion in
transactions on the futures markets which, in turn, transferred nearly
$1.7 billion in selling pressure to the stock exchanges.88
Both index arbitrage and portfolio insurance rely on particular mathe-
matical formulae and computer programs to determine the timing and
profitability of each transaction. 9 A simple model of a formula used by
Stem, How VO= VSN(dl) - E/e[rt]N(d2) led to Black Monday, Forbes, Jan. 25, 1988, at
55, 57-58. These firms are often referred to as "insurers." See id. at 58.
79. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at 7; Pickard & Axe, supra note 20, at 92-94.
80. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at 7.
81. See Pickard & Axe, supra note 20, at 92.
82. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 71, at 211-13.
83. See Pickard & Axe, supra note 20, at 92.
84. See SEC Crash Report, supra note 15, at 1-3.
85. See Sloan & Stem, supra note 78, at 58 (overview of portfolio insurance's impact
during market crash).
86. See Lawrence Harris, The Dangers of Regulatory Overreaction to the October 1987
Crash, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 927, 935 (1989) (noting that portfolio insurance has dropped
over a third within a year of crash); Pickard & Axe, supra note 20, at 93-94 (same).
87. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at 25.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 7; Weiner, supra note 18, at 148-53. Index arbitrageurs and portfolio
insurers also use the NYSE's computerized order entry system to place orders on the
NYSE's floor. The system, DOT (Digital Order Turnaround) or Super DOT, accepts
pre-opening market orders of 5999 shares or less (OARS or Opening Automated Report
Services is the exchange's name for DOT's pre-opening order system), post-opening mar-
ket orders of 30,999 and limit orders of 99,999. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at VI-
11. A pre-opening order is any order entered before 9:30 a.m.; a post-opening order is
any order entered after 9:30 a.m. See id. A market order is "an order to buy or sell a
stated amount of a security at the most advantageous price obtainable after the order is
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index arbitrageurs targets a future contract's price that trades at a pre-
mium to the cash or spot markets based on the carrying costs (usually
represented as the ninety-day T-Bill rate).' ° If the futures market ex-
ceeds or falls below this point (also known as basis), a program is trig-
gered, and the arbitraguers enter their orders.9 '
Index-related trading of this ilk has raised serious questions con-
cerning the effects of these programs on the securities market.92 The
initial question of manipulation arose from the increased volatility
caused by the programs during the so-called "triple witching hour. '93
From the initiation of index arbitrage in the early 1980s until July 1987,
the triple witch occurred in the last hour of the last business day
of the quarter when index futures, equity options,94 and index
represented in the Trading Crowd." New York Stock Exchange, Inc., The Official Con-
stitution and Rules of the New York Stock Exchange Inc. 2013, Rule 13, at 2528
(1990). A limit order is "an order to buy or sell a stated amount of a security at a
specified price, or at a better price, if obtainable after the order is represented in the
Trading Crowd." Ide
90. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 148-50. This model can be expressed mathemati-
cally as F* = S(1 + r - d). In this formula, "F*" represents the fair value of the index
futures contract, "S" represents the spot value of the underlying index, "r" represents the
riskless rate of interest for borrowing funds over the life of the contract (i.e., 90 day T-
bills), and "d" represents the rate at which dividends of the stocks in the underlying index
are expected to accrue. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 71, at 203 n.99. For example,
if the annual yield on T-bills is seven percent, the annual yield on dividends is four per-
cent, and the spot value on the S&P 500 is 240.00, then the fair value of the S&P 500
index future with three months to expiration is 241.80. [241.80 = 240.00 X (1 + 0.0175
- 0.01)]. See id.
91. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 71, at 213.
92. See Susan Antilla, Phelan: Market Is Volatile Enough Without Programs, USA
Today, Nov. 10, 1989, at 10B (former Chairman of the NYSE attacking the volatility
caused by program trading); John Crudele, A Recipe for Increased Volatility Small Trad-
ers Leaving Stock Index Futures to The Big Brokerages, Wash. Post, June 24, 1990, at
H13 (noting that locals [small independent futures dealers] were leaving the index futures
pit to a small group of large brokerage firms, who were gaining more control over the
direction of futures prices); John Crudele, How Crafty Speculators 'Persuade' the Market
Contracts on Index Futures Bought Rapidly, Wash. Post, May 26, 1991, at H7 (noting
that the futures market is used to "persuade" the equities markets, particularly on slow
volume days); Craig Torres & Kevin G. Salwen, New Hot Line Hunts Program Trading
Abuse, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1990, at C1 (reporting that the NYSE had established a hot
line for institutional investors to report program trading abuses and asks whether they
think their brokers are manipulating the market).
93. See Sloan & Stem, supra note 78, at 55.
94. Equity options grant the holder the right, but do not obligate the holder, to
purchase or sell an individual security at a predetermined price within a predetermined
amount of time. See Nix & Nix, supra note 25, at 11. A call option grants the holder the
right to buy, and a put option the right to sell a specified number of shares. See id. Each
option contract represents 100 shares of stock. See id For example, an individual can
buy 10 IBM October 100 calls at $1.00; this option grants the buyer the right to purchase
1000 shares of IBM at $100 per share between the time of purchase and the expiration of
the call in the coming October for a transaction cost of $1000 plus commissions. See id.
at 13. There are risks associated with each type of option strategy. See id. at 14. For
instance, the purchase of a call risks the cost of the contract. In the above example the
buyer is risking the $1000 if the option expires worthless. Perhaps the riskiest strategy is
the writing of a naked call--selling the right to purchase a security which the seller
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options95 all expired at the same time. During a triple witch, owners of
options and futures attempted to close out their positions at the best pos-
sible spread price using "Market on Close"96 orders. These index-gener-
ated orders flooded the market, generally swamping the demand or
surpassing the supply of the securities. Consequently, stock prices traded
far beyond the usual ranges indicated by fundamental valuation tech-
niques during a triple witch.9 7
Although there have been some expressions of doubt that programs
added to this market volatility,9" the SEC and the relevant SROs took
measures to reduce the problem. Originally, the exchanges staggered the
hours of expiration and trading.99 Despite these efforts, however, market
volatility persisted at the time of the 1987 Crash."° Further, there are
strong indications that program trading still contributes to market vola-
tility today. 01 As a result, some have seen fit to label program trading
manipulative. 102
II. MANIPULATION AS DEFINED BY THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934
In determining whether program trading is manipulative, it is first nec-
essary to examine the definition of "manipulation" under the '34 Act.
This task involves a close scrutiny of the statutory language and of the
neither hedged or owned. The risk involved here is that the stock will skyrocket (usually
expressed as unlimited risk) beyond the premium paid and the option will be executed,
thus forcing the writer to cover the option by buying the stock in the open market.
95. An option contract on the index has the same features as an equity option, except
that the underlying product is an index. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at VI- 19 to VI-
20. The options value is derived from the price of the underlying index. See Nix & Nix,
supra note 25, at 12. There are also index futures-options which grant the right but not
the obligation to take or make delivery of an index futures contract. See id. at 11. The
options price is set by the corresponding futures price and not the price of the underlying
index. See id.
96. A Market "At the Close Order" is defined as "[a] market order which is to be
executed at or as near to the close as practicable." New York Stock Exchange, Inc., The
Official Constitution and Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 2013, Rule 13,
at 2527 (1990).
97. See SEC Staff to Pursue Ways to Limit Expiration Friday Price Volatility, 18 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 795 (June 6, 1986).
98. See 'Perception Problem' Cited in Program Trading Discussion, 18 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1001 (July 11, 1986).
99. See SEC Says Program Trading Changes Greatly Reduced Volatility Woes, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1083, 1083-84 (July 24, 1987) (shifting of settlement hours for
index-related derivatives to the opening rather than the close, relieving some of the price
pressure).
100. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at v.
101. See Diana B. Henriques, Similarities to 1987, & Significant Differences: Rates
Lower; Mutual Fund Activity Slow, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1991, at D I (noting that index-
related trading accounted for up to 20 to 30 points of the Dow's 120 point decline); Floyd
Norris, Market Place: S.E.C. "s Analysis of Nov. 15 Plunge, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1992, at
D8 (use of index-related trading strategies accelerated the market's 102 point drop on
Nov. 15, 1991).
102. See Thel, supra note 8, at 429.
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historical context of the '34 Act, as well as relevant case law. Moreover,
it helps to contrast the '34 Act's definition of manipulation with defini-
tions of manipulation under the Commodities Exchange Act and pro-
posed by academics.
A. The Relevant Statutory Provisions
Sections 9(a), 10(b) and 14(e) of the '34 Act proscribe securities ma-
nipulation. The SEC uses these sections in tandem with Rule l0b-5' °3 in
addressing the issue of manipulation.
1. Securities Manipulation Under Section 9(a)(2)" °
The goal of section 9(a)(2), which the SEC has called the "very heart
of the Act," 105 extends beyond merely outlawing pool operations."0 ' The
section regulates all acts and devices that tend to create an illusion of
supply or demand where no such supply or demand exists."t° Section
9(a), Congress's first anti-manipulation effort, was carried over, almost
word for word, from the '34 Act's original version,' and is clearly di-
rected toward deceptive activities."° Section 9(a)(2) seeks to prevent the
creation of artificial prices with the intent to induce investors into
purchasing or selling securities.
There are three elements necessary to prove manipulative practices
under 9(a)(2): (i) A series of transactions; (ii) creating an artificial price;
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). Rule lOb-5 prohibits any person, in relation to the
purchase and sale of securities to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or
"engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud." Id.
104. Because § 9(a) covers several types of manipulation, including wash sales and
matched orders, this part of the Note will necessarily be limited to § 9(a)(2): price
manipulation.
105. Report of the Securities Exchange Commission, Proposals for Amendments to
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, H.R. Comm. Print,
Comm. on Int'l. & Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1941).
106. See Stock Exchange Practices, Report of Comm. on Banking & Currency, S. Rep.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1934).
107. See id
108. See H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 10 Legislative History of
the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, item no. 24, at 20 (J.S.
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) (the original versions of §§ 9(a) and 10(b)).
109. Section 9(a) states in relevant part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange, or for any member of a national securities
exchange... (2) [t]o effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of
transactions in any security registered on a national securities exchange creating
actual or apparent active trading in such security or raising or depressing the
price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such
security by others.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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and (iii) showing a manipulative purpose.10
In determining whether the "series of transactions" element is met, the
SEC has determined that three transactions are sufficient. 1  The SEC
does not require a purchase or sale but does equate bidding on a security
to a series of transactions." 2 Bidding "may be as effective an influence
on price as a completed sale.""' 3 The prevalent use of bids to implement
manipulative schemes led the SEC to codify bids on securities as transac-
tions.' In doing so, the SEC relied on the theory that the false bid
would coerce other buyers to enter higher bids.' 15
The second element, creation of an artificial price, is discoverable by
circumstantial evidence about the performance of a stock both before and
after the alleged manipulation took place." 6 Typically, proof of stock
manipulation is seen in "the collapse of the market for the security when
the manipulator ceases his activity.""' 7 When the manipulator's support
or pressure is removed from the stock, the price returns to its "natural"
levels. This return often leaves those investors who bought stock from or
sold stock to the manipulator with deep losses." 8
Finding a series of transactions and the creation of an artificial price
are not the difficult part of a securities manipulation claim; rather, the
challenge has been finding the requisite manipulative purpose.
The central, and third element, in all manipulation charges is whether
the defendant had a manipulative purpose. Absent an admission from
the defendant, which rarely occurs," 9 the manipulative purpose is also
shown through circumstantial evidence.' 20 Courts have generally looked
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 111990); 3 Louis Loss, Securities Regula-
tion 1550 (2d ed. 1961) (phrasing 9(a)(2) requirements).
111. See, e.g., Kidder Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559, 570 (1945) (holding the defend-
ants' three separate purchases over a two day period met the "series of transactions"
requirement).
112. See id. at 568-70.
113. Id. at 570.
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7(b)(2) (1992).
115. See Loss, supra note 110, at 1550.
116. See Pagel, Inc. v. SEC, 803 F.2d 942, 945-46 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming SEC find-
ing that dominant stock position in connection with sharp price fluctuations was suffi-
cient proof of stock manipulation); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967)
("[R]apidly rising prices in the absence of any demand are well-known symptoms of...
unlawful market operations.").
117. SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court
also noted that here are three other elements: price leadership, dominion and control,
and a reduced stock float. See id. at 976-78.
118. See id.
119. See Loss, supra note 110, at 1552.
120. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983) (scienter
may be "a matter of inference from circumstantial evidence"); Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733
F.2d 1054, 1058 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[pl]roof of scienter need not be direct"); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.) (using circumstantial evidence to prove
scienter), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 1969) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); In re Federal
Corp., 25 S.E.C. 227, 230 (1947) (same); In re Leroy A. Strasburger & Co., 14 S.E.C. 397,
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to a separate pecuniary motive to supply this evidence. Examples in-
clude owning a large block of stock that defendant wished to sell,"'2 par-
ticipating in the distribution of a large block of stock in which the
defendant had a stake,122 and owning an option on a security at a higher
or lower strike price than the prevailing market price.'"
The presence of an improper purpose to induce others to buy or sell at
an artificial price or to unduly influence the market in a particular stock
is necessary to determine whether the activity should be condemned as
unlawful manipulation.2 4 As one court has found: "So long as the in-
vestor's motive in buying or selling a security is not to create an artificial
demand for, or supply of, the security, illegal market manipulation is not
established." '125 Moreover, many completely legitimate stock purchases
may be at successively higher prices, or on plus ticks at or near the close
of trading. Similarly, simply "[b]ringing about a price rise ... is not
unlawful in itself."' 26 Congress expressly rejected the notion that manip-
ulative intent could be inferred from the fact that the trader made sizea-
ble purchases or sales and knew or should have known that this would
affect the price of the security. 27 Congress realized that section 9(a)
would not cover all methods of manipulation. Accordingly, it passed
section 10(b) to enable the SEC to protect the market from innovative
means of manipulating the market. 2 '
2. Securities Manipulation Under Section 10(b)
Under section 10(b) of the '34 Act, Congress granted the SEC the
power to regulate manipulative and deceptive devices that would disrupt
the market place or cause harm to investors. 29 Congress intended sec-
403 (1943) ("Determination of the [manipulative] purpose... is at best a difficult task,
involving the drawing of inferences from the transactions themselves and from the sur-
rounding circumstances.").
121. See RJ. Koeppe & Co. v. SEC, 95 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1938) (paying touts to
recommend security).
122. See SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 977-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
123. See In re Charles C. Wright, 3 S.E.C. 190, 197, 199-202, 206 (1938), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940).
124. See S. Rep. No 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1934).
125. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); see also Aaron v. SEC 446 U.S. 680, 689-95 (1980) (extending
the scienter requirement to SEC enforcement actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5);
Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982) ("scien-
ter" is an element of manipulation), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
126. Opinion of General Counsel, Exchange Act Release No. 3056, at 2 (Oct. 27,
1941).
127. See S. Rep. No. 792, supra note 124, at 16, 17; H.R. Rep. No. 1383, supra note
124, at 20.
128. See Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foriegn Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (spokesman for the '34 Act's
drafters stating that § 10(b) was to protect against future and unforeseen manipulation
schemes and devices).
129. In pertinent part, section 10(b) states as follows:
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tion 10(b) to act as a catchall to section 9(a), empowering the SEC "to
deal with new manipulative [or cunning] devices"' 3 ° that were not
thought of at the time of the '34 Act's conception. In order to implement
the mandate of section 10(b), the SEC has promulgated numerous rules,
including Rule lOb-5, that seek to prevent the misuse of the markets.13 '
Although section 10(b)'s language appears open to expansive interpreta-
tion, the Supreme Court has limited its scope to those manipulative de-
vices that act to deceive or defraud. 132
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,113 the Supreme Court stated that ma-
nipulation is "virtually a term of art when used in connection with secur-
ities markets .... connot[ing] intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors."'3 4 Oddly, although the Court stated that
manipulation is "a term of art," it relied on the 1934 edition of Webster's
International Dictionary to define manipulation. 35 In Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green,' 36 the Court further explained that "[t]he term [ma-
nipulation] refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched
orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artifi-
cially affecting market activity."' 37 The Court reasoned that the '34 Act
had "substitute[d] a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor,"'3 thus requiring a finding of deceit to prove manipula-
tion. Following Ernst & Ernst and Santa Fe, the Court later extended its
It shall be unlawful for any person .... (b) [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities ex-
change or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules of and regulations as the Commis-
sion may proscribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)
130. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (comment of '34 Act drafter Thomas
Corcoran).
131. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-I (1992) (Rule lOa-1 limits the use of short sales,
considered the primary tool of manipulators); 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 la-1 (1992) (prohibiting
self-dealing by members of a national securities exchange).
132. Rule lOb-5, although pertinent in part, is not central to the discussion at hand.
Oddly, when the court interprets section lOb-including its limiting decisions discussed
below-it is actually handling Rule lOb-5 cases.
133. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
134. Id. at 199.
135. Id. at 199 & n.21. An early writer on the stock exchanges, Sereno S. Platt, used a
similar method to define manipulation. He, however, did not limit the definition to
fraudulent or deceptive acts. See Frank Fayant, Short Sales and Manipulation of Securi-
ties, 19-24 (1913) (quoting Sereno S. Platt, The Work of Wall Street 147, 364 (1912)).
Rather, Platt asserted that there was a "higher type of manipulation" in which no fraud
of deceit was used. Id. at 22. Instead, the manipulator uses secrecy and diplomacy to
raise or lower the price of a security. See id. at 23. The Supreme Court relied solely upon
the part of the definition that described manipulation as fraud or deceit. See Ernst, 425
U.S. at 199 & n.21
136. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
137. Id. at 476.
138. Id. at 477.
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narrow definition of manipulation to all cases arising under the '34
Act. 139
In applying the Supreme Court's definition, lower courts have at-
tempted to reconcile the broad language of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
with the requirement of deception.1" One court stated that "[10b-5's]
prohibition with respect to manipulative activity is not confined to any
particular kind of manipulative activity but ... is necessarily designed to
outlaw every device 'used to persuade the public that activity in a secur-
ity is the reflection of a genuine demand instead of a mirage.' 9t14" In
contrast, another court explained that, although some practices appear to
be injurious and unfair to investors, they are not prohibited by section
10(b).142 This court found that "[m]anipulation cannot be extended to
cover every form of unfair dealing which appears to the layperson to be
manipulative."143 Currently, under the Supreme Court's definition, an
investor injured by the effects of a manipulative scheme, but who cannot
show deception, will find no recourse in the '34 Act's manipulation
sections.
The SEC, in following the Supreme Court's definition of manipulation,
has culled out approximately fifteen separate categories of manipulative
activities. 1" To meet the deception requirement, the SEC has expanded
its definition of "intent to deceive" to bizarre and often counter-intuitive
139. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1985) (extending the re-
quirement of deception to cases under § 14(e) of the Williams Act).
140. See United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 370-71 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
the defendant's activities-using a floor broker not often used, and the floor broker's
failure to reveal the purchaser-were not sufficient proof of the deceptive intent required
for a 10(b) manipulation charge); Pagel, Inc. v. SEC, 803 F.2d 942, 945-46 (8th Cir.
1986) (quoting In re Pagel, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
83,909, at 87,752 (Aug. 1, 1985)) (agreeing with the SEC that the defendants had abused
their dominant position in a security; the SEC stated that the defendants' "engage[d] in a
scheme to distort the price of a security for their own benefit, they violate[d] the security
laws by perpetrating a fraud on all public investors"); Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747
F.2d 209, 214 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that an add-on agreement did not create artificial
barriers to the market nor did it act to mislead investors); Shivers v. Amerco, 670 F.2d
826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a manipulation claim under l0b-5, like a claim
under § 9(a), must clearly state that the alleged manipulator "artificially affected market
activity in order to mislead investors"); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,
287-88 (7th Cir.) (holding that deception is a necessary element of lOb-5 manipulation
claims), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
141. SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting 3
Louis Loss, Securities Regulation 549-55 (2d ed. 1961)).
142. See Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 526 F. Supp. 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), offid
683 F.2d 51 (1982).
143. Id, But see Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385, 388-94 (1990) (calling for a much more extensive
view of manipulation than that currently held by the Supreme Court).
144. See Arthur F. Matthews et al., Manipulative Practicer Past, Present and Future,
in Trading Practices, The Portfolio Execution Process, and Soft Dollar Practices 1990, at
99, 113-28 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 684, 1990) (a clear
and concise overview of the types of manipulation cases covered by the Act).
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limits. For example, in SEC v. Choset, 145 the court accepted a consent
agreement which recognized an act known as "painting the tape" as ma-
nipulative. 146 This practice involves entering large orders near the mar-
ket's close in order to move the closing price.147 The defendant, Choset,
engaged in this activity in order to boost his department's profit/loss
statement for the year and receive a larger Christmas bonus. 148
Although Choset had no intent to deceive investors, he did, however,
intend to deceive his employers. While there is no statement of why sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 were implicated, the SEC concluded that
Choset's acts were manipulative because the fictitious trades could, if en-
tered often enough, induce investors to purchase or sell securities.1 4
9
Oddly, the two major markets for investment--commodities and se-
curities-define manipulation differently. The commodities markets de-
fine manipulation as the intentional creation of an artificial price. Thus,
although intent is required in both securities and commodities cases, in-
tent to defraud is required only in securities cases. The following Section
examines and contrasts the different definitions and attempts to deter-
mine which definitions offers a better model in light of the legal history of
the '34 Act.
3. Manipulation as Defined in the Commodities Exchange Act
In comparison to the '34 Act cases, the Commodities cases have a
broader definition of manipulation. 5 This view of manipulation is
145. 28 S.E.C. Docket 172 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1983).
146. See id. Usually traders paint the tape to increase their credit standing or to get a
better bonuses. See Matthews et al., supra note 144, at 120.
147. See Choset, 28 S.E.C. Docket at 173.
148. See id. at 172.
149. See Thel, supra note 143, at 419-20.
150. Commodities manipulation, particularly in futures trading, has a much longer
history of investigation and legislation than securities manipulation. Beginning with the
first futures trading, shortly after the Civil War, farmers and merchants began to call on
the government to either halt all futures trading or monitor it closely to prevent manipu-
lation. See Markham, supra note 1, at 287-88. From 1884 until 1921, more than 200 bills
were presented before the Congress, but none got out of committee. See Note, Federal
Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 Yale L.J. 822, 832 n.46 (1951). Farm-belt
Congressmen were worried about the deleterious effects of the "artificial" pricing struc-
ture brought about by futures trading. See 23 Cong. Rec. 5980, 5984 (July 11, 1892)
(statement of Sen. Washburn) (attacking the futures markets as disastrous to U.S. farm-
ers).
After these numerous false starts, Congress enacted the Grain Futures Act in order to
regulate futures trading. See 42 Stat. 998 (1922). Contained in the Act was Congress's
first anti-manipulation measure. Congress demanded that the exchanges prevent their
members from engaging in price manipulation. See id. § 5. The Act's primary purpose
was "to control the evils of manipulation of prices in grain... effected through dealings
in grain futures." Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1933). The
driving force was not deceit but the effect that manipulation had on the cash markets. In
1974, Congress, feeling that the futures exchanges and Commodities Exchange Authority
had failed to police their members adequately, created the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission. See 7 U.S.C. § 4(a) (1988). Congress outlawed manipulation in the 1974
Act, but left it up to the courts to define the term. See id. § 13(b).
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closer to the definition held by financial experts at the time of the '34
Act's writing."' Manipulation, in these cases, is governed by section
13(b) of the Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA").5 2 The CEA, how-
ever, does not define manipulation but rather leaves this task to the
courts. 3 Similarly, Congress did not define manipulation in sections
9(a), 10(b), or 14(e) of the '34 Act.
Often in commodities cases, the courts determine manipulation in the
factual context of a "squeeze"'154 or an attempt to "comer the mar-
ket."'55 For example, in Frey v. Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion,' 56 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit defined
manipulation as an "intentional exaction of a price determined by forces
other than supply and demand." '157 The Court laid out the elements of a
squeeze as follows: (i) holding a controlling or dominant position in the
market; (ii) intending to execute the squeeze; (iii) intending to create an
artificial price; and (iv) creating an artificial price with the squeeze.5'5
Unlike the securities cases, there is no requirement that the manipulator
intend to deceive investors.'59
In contrast to Frey, courts have treated stock market domination cases
quite differently. In United States v. Mulheren,1 ° for example, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that defendant's order, which constituted over seventy
percent of the market from the opening until 11:10 a.m., was not enough
to be considered evidence of market manipulation. 6 The Second Cir-
cuit also held that due to the lack of deception on the defendant's part,
the charge could not be carried.162
While the securities cases have struggled to find deceit, the commodi-
ties markets have focused simply on the creation of an artificial price.
Although this latter interpretation may result in prosecutorial difficul-
151. See Dice, supra note 54, at 414; 1 Dos Passos, supra note 5, at 647.
152. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1988).
153. See id
154. A squeeze is defined as a position in the futures market that far exceeds the deliv-
erable supply of the underlying commodity. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154,
1162 (8th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
155. Cornering the market is having and maintaining a dominant position in the spot
commodities market. See id at 1162.
156. 931 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1991).
157. let at 1175; see also In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n, Inc., [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuL L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796 (1982) ("[S]pecific intent to
create an 'artificial' or 'distorted' price is the sine qua non of manipulation.").
158. See Frey, 931 F.2d at 1175.
159. See il; see also Utesch v. Dittmer, 947 F.2d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1991) (defining
artificial price as any price not established by supply and demand), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct.
1764 (1992); Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962) (defining
"manipulation" as purposeful conduct calculated to bring about a price distortion); Gen-
eral Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1948) (defining manipula-
tion as the extraction of artificial prices; those prices not arising from natural forces).
160. 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991).
161. See i at 371-72.
162. See id
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ties, 163 it offers a viable alternative to the Supreme Court's deceit-based
definition of securities manipulation.
Perhaps the most important difference between market manipulation
in commodities and securities is in the injury requirement. Courts differ-
entiate securities manipulation from commodities manipulation by look-
ing to the injured party. Specifically, in securities cases, the investor is
injured. 1 " In commodities cases, the market is injured. 16 5 As one court
stated in a commodities case,
[i]n order for the.., market to perform its functions effectively, prices
must reflect as nearly as possible market factors of supply and demand.
Manipulation of prices by means not reflecting basic supply and de-
mand factors creates conditions which prevent the ... market from
performing its basic economic function and hence diminishes its utility
to those members of the trade and general public who rely on its basic
purposes. 166
Moreover, courts examining commodity manipulation do not look at the
methods used or ask whether a profit was made because "the economic
harm done by manipulation is just as great" regardless whether money
was made or lost. 167
4. Academic Definition of Manipulation
Currently, there is also a tension among scholars, over the definition of
manipulation. On the one hand, some theorists believe that the term
should be broadly construed in order to coincide with the historical data
163. The cases prosecuting commodities manipulation are rarer than those prosecuting
securities manipulation because of the extended and difficult economic analyses that the
courts require in order to prove the accused created an artificial price. See Markham,
supra note 1, at 356-58, 361-62 (noting that the CFTC has brought as many manipulation
cases in the years of its existence as the SEC usually brings in one year). Because of this
lack of prosecution, many commentators have called for a redefinition of manipulation.
See, e.g., Edward T. McDermmott, Defining Manipulation in Commodities Futures Trad-
ing: The Futures "Squeeze", 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 202, 205 (noting that the analysis of
manipulation under the CEA is confusing, contradictory, complex, and unsophisticated).
Redefining "manipulation," however, may be insufficient to solve this problem. Instead,
it may be necessary to increase the CFTC's enforcement and regulatory power grant the
staff more leeway to prosecute cases. See Markham, supra note 1, at 361, 368-70, 375.
164. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (stating that § 10(b)
"provides a cause of action for any plaintiff who 'suffer[s] an injury as a result of decep-
tive practices'" (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
12-13 (1971)).
165. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1171 (8th Cir. 1971) (stating that
the defendants' executed squeeze caused severe fluctuations and thus "constituted a
threat to a free and orderly market"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
166. Id. at 1158.
167. Id. at 1163; see also United States v. Lewis, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,479, at 93,053 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1989) (denying defendants' motion to
dismiss the manipulation charge because a profit or gain is in not "an element of a § 10(b)
manipulation offense"). But see United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 370 (2d Cir.
1991) ("One of the hallmarks of manipulation is some profit or personal gain inuring to
the alleged manipulator.").
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regarding the intent of the drafters of the '34 Act. 6" This theory reasons
that by limiting the '34 Act to "substitut[ing] a philosophy of full disclo-
sure for the philosophy of caveat emptor,"16 9 the Supreme Court has mis-
interpreted the original intent of the '34 Act."'0 The goal of section
10(b), according to this theory, was to grant the SEC power to regulate
manipulative or deceptive devices and this power is not limited to fraud-
ulent acts. 7 ' This theory also notes that, by requiring deceit, the
Supreme Court limited what was a generally accepted definition in 1934.
A financial scholar just before the '34 Act's inception noted that "manip-
ulation is usually understood [to mean] the creation of an artificial price
by planned action, whether by one man or a group of men." '72 More-
over, as one court found, the essential objective of securities legislation is
to protect both the individual investor and the marketplace from the
overreaching of sharp operators.173
Other theorists, however, see no need to define manipulation, or be-
lieve that the term is at best defined overbroadly if not erroneously.' 74
They premise their argument against regulating manipulation on four ba-
sic grounds. First, "there is no objective definition" for manipulation.17 5
Second, that the subjective test for manipulation fails to exclude perfectly
legal activity. 76 Third, any attempt to manipulate the market is self-
defeating.1 77 Due to the cost of manipulation, it makes no sense to ma-
nipulate. Finally, because regulating manipulation is so expensive, it
achieves no constructive ends and simply wastes the taxpayers' money. 178
Thus, according to these theorists the regulation of manipulation is both
inappropriate and wasteful.17 9 Nevertheless, manipulation is illegal and
continues to be prosecuted.
To determine the appropriate definition of manipulation and whether
program trading would fall within that definition, it is helpful to examine
the historical background and legislative history of the '34 Act's anti-
manipulation sections.
168. See Thel, supra note 143, at 385, 388-460.
169. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); see also Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (quoting Capital Gains); Amlinted Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (same).
170. See Thel, supra note 143, at 388-90.
171. See id at 388-94.
172. Dice, supra note 54, at 414.
173. See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943); see also 2
Charles H. Meyer, The Law of Stockbrokers and Stock Exchanges 34-35 (2d ed. 1936)
("One of the evils which the Securities Exchange Act was designed to prevent is the
manipulation of securities markets by practices which are deceptive or otherwise im-
proper.") (emphasis added).
174. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation"
in Financial Markets, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 503, 507-10 (1991).
175. See id, at 510, 508-10.
176. See id. at 519-20.
177. See id. at 512-13, 547-49, 553.
178. See id. at 522-23, 553.
179. See idl at 553.
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B. The Historical and Legal Background of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934
1. The Historical Underpinnings of the '34 Act
In section 2 of the '34 Act, Congress aimed to protect investors from
the unscrupulous activities of traders, particularly those who would ma-
nipulate the market.8 0 As such, Congress intended a broad, inclusive
definition of manipulation. 8' The Supreme Court, however, has inter-
preted the definition of manipulation narrowly, requiring an element of
deception.1 12  This definition may be counter-intuitive, particularly in
light of Congress's overriding concern with the stock market's pricing
structure.18 3 Although there is little in the way of traditional legislative
history regarding section 10(b), there are extensive records of congres-
sional and public debates over the role of the market in society.' 84 Addi-
180. Section 2 (Necessity for Regulation) states in relevant part as follows:
[T]o insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions:
(3) Frequently the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets are sus-
ceptible to manipulation and control, and the dissemination of such prices gives
rise to excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations
in the prices of securities which (a) cause alternately unreasonable expansion
and unreasonable contraction of the volume of credit available ... [and] (b)
hinder the proper appraisal of the value of securities ....
(4) National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the
dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate
commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified,
and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of
security prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets....
15 U.S.C. § 78b, 78b(3)-(4) (1988).
181. See Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (testimony of '34 Act drafter
Thomas Corcoran).
182. See Schreiber v. Burlington N. Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1985) (extending the require-
ment of deception to cases under § 14(e) of the Williams Act); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (stating that deceit is an element of manipulation); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (holding that scienter is required for all
§ 10(b) violations).
183. See Thel, supra note 143, at 391-92.
184. See State of New York, Report of Governor Hughes' Comm. on Speculation in
Securities and Commodities (June 7, 1909) (reporting the findings of the investigations
into the operation of the stock markets) [hereinafter Hughes' Committee Report]; House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, Report to the House of Representatives, Together
with the Views of the Minority, of the Comm. Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions
429 and 504, to Investigate the Concentration of Money and Credit, H.R. Rep. No. 1593,
62d Cong., 3d Sess. 33-54, 114-28, 162-63 (1913) [hereinafter Money Trust Investigation
Report] (investigation of Representative Ars6ne Pujo into the nature of control certain
individuals had in the securities and commodities markets); H.R. No. 7852, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934) reprinted in 10 Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 & Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, item no. 24 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973)
(the original version of § 10b); Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House
Comm. on Interstate and For. Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 108-17 (1934) (comments
of a drafter in hearings on the '34 Act's predecessor); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Stock Market
Manipulation, 1938 Colum. L. Rev. 393 (manipulation as defined by one of the drafters of
the 1934 Act).
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tionally, the drafters of the '34 Act and their predecessors in the Hughes'
Committee and the Money Trust Investigation left vast numbers of docu-
ments recording their understanding of the market. 18 5
In the early part of this century, three stock market crashes brought
about serious investigations into the operation of the securities markets.
The first investigation arose out of the Panic of 1907 when depositors lost
confidence in a group of New York banks that were thought to be stock
market pool operators. The banks lost large amounts when their alleged
pool operations failed and a run on the banks occurred followed. As a
result, the stock market fell sharply. 86 Governor Charles Evans
Hughes187 of New York led a committee that investigated the causes of
the collapse. The Committee avoided using "manipulation" in the pejo-
rative sense, believing that certain manipulations (e.g., price stabiliza-
tion) had beneficial purposes.188 The Committee, however, sought to
censure those individuals who had moved market prices "to draw in the
public as buyers and to unload upon them the holdings of the opera-
tors."189 This finding is arguably a precursor to section 9(a)(2) of the '34
Act.
Moreover, the Committee also found speculation, specifically gam-
bling, hazardous to the market's stability."9° The Committee's conclu-
sion was not necessarily related to the acts intended to draw investors
into the market. 9 ' Rather, the committee focused on the effects of the
speculation on the market's valuation of stock prices. 192
In the end the Committee left it to the NYSE to police its members
and to lessen the effects of speculation. 93 Since little was done by the
NYSE to implement the suggestions of the Hughes' Committee, Con-
gress, in 1912, authorized an investigation. The purpose of the inquiry,
known as The Money Trust Investigation, was to determine if, as was
widely believed, a relatively small number of financiers controlled the
markets and banks. 94 Even though it centered on banking practices, the
investigation found manipulation of the securities markets troubling:
A very important phase of speculation on the New York Stock Ex-
change is the manipulation of prices up or down, as desired, without
regard to the real value of the securities, and the creation of a false
appearance of activity in particular stocks .... [Tihis practice prevents
the exchange from faithfully reflecting the current value of securities-
185. See supra note 184.
186. See, eg.,Thel, supra note 143, at 395 (sources cited).
187. Hughes later served as a Supreme Court Justice from 1930-1940. See Walter F.
Murphy et al., American Constitutional Interpretation 1226 (1986).
188. See Hughes' Committee Report, supra note 184, at 7; see also Thel, supra note
143, at 397-400 (discussing Hughes Committee).
189. Hughes' Committee Report, supra note 184, at 7.
190. See id at 4.
191. See id
192. See id.
193. See id at 10-11.
194. See Money Trust Investigation Report, supra note 184, at 13, 17.
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one of its true functions-and gives those controlling great supplies of
capital a further power over the enterprises of the country. 19
Although the investigation did not conduct a thorough examination of
manipulative practices, it did look into the notorious "pools.' 196 Pools
consisted of a group of individuals who would use their combined vast
resources to push a stock up or down. 19 7 The pools used whatever means
necessary, both deceptive and truthful, to accomplish the movement of a
stock price.1 98 Many of the pools used concerted buying or selling, in
conjunction with rumors, to take control of a stock's float. Whether the
pools used deceptive practices was determined by their needs at the time
of transaction. 199 Not all pools were successful in their endeavors, but
the effects of failures were just as disturbing to the market as the suc-
cesses.2"° The Committee noted that the pools contributed to specula-
tion, and that speculation "whether for the rise or for the fall, needs to be
curbed rather than stimulated." 10' The investigators concluded that
Congress should reform the securities markets.2"
The findings of both the Hughes' Committee and the Money Trust
Investigation were widely disseminated among American leaders in gov-
ernment and business. Nevertheless, they were not acted upon until after
the market crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression." 3 At
this time, a backlash of public contempt over the "rigged practices" of
the stock markets led to the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33
Act), the '34 Act, and the creation of the SEC.2" President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, with the aid of members of Congress, set out to reform the
operations of securities markets and to solve the markets' problems
through legislation.2"5 Roosevelt handpicked a group of men to draft the
'34 Act.206 Their mission was to enable the federal government to pro-
hibit the sharp practices that operators used to profit from the market
without regard for basic tenets of fairness.20 7
195. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
196. See id. at 46-52.
197. See Dice, supra note 54, at 427-33 (describing the operation and establishment of
security pools and noting the tricky nature of that form of manipulation). Pools, in many
ways, resembled the trusts the Sherman Act was to abolish. A pool would have its indi-
vidual members sign contracts granting discretionary power to a single member. These
contracts would forbid any member from purchasing or selling the security in question
without the permission of the whole pool. See id. at 428.
198. See id. at 434.
199. See id. at 430-31.
200. See id. at 434-35. Professor Dice discusses the failure of the Rock Island Pool,
which was brought down by an intervening work stoppage. Dice notes that the pool's
failure disrupted the market's flow of capital. See id.
201. Money Trust Investigation Report, supra note 184, at 52.
202. See id. at 115-28.
203. See Parrish, supra note 3, at 21-41.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 47-48.
206. See id. at 108-44.
207. See id. at 111.
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The '34 Act included numerous disclosure sections, but it was also
directed toward the effects of speculative trading. It also included at-
tempts to use margin requirements to limit speculation."° Additionally,
the '34 Act mandated the segregation of trading and brokerage on the
floors of the exchanges.2' 9 There are also indications, in both the lan-
guage of the Act itself and in the congressional history, that deception
may not have been a necessary element in all manipulation claims.
The intent of section 10(b) to prevent the market from overt and dan-
gerous speculation may be derived from the conjunction of these debates
and documents.21 In accordance with this intent, section 10(b) is
broadly worded and grants the SEC the power to proscribe any "manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivane ... necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors."2"' The only lan-
guage in the section that leads one to believe that fraud is an element is
the phrase "manipulative or deceptive devices."2 2
Although manipulation has various meanings, in light of the history
one must consider who the '34 Act sought to protect and what it sought
to prevent. When one of the '34 Act's authors, Thomas "Tommy the
Cork" Corcoran, was asked what section 10(b) meant, he answered:
"Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices."2 ' Whether this
statement implies a prerequisite of deceit is not clear.21 4
2. The Supreme Court's Definition of Manipulation in Light of the
'34 Act's History
The Supreme Court has managed to read out the "or" and added an
"and" into the phrase "manipulative or deceptive devices."'21 In doing
so, the Court may have erroneously analogized the philosophy of the '33
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1988) (establishing minimal margin requirements for securi-
ties accounts); see also Parrish, supra note 3, at 129 (quoting Henry Morgenthau, Memo-
randum on Conversation with Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Mar. 22, 1934), in Official
Files 34, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers Box 2) (using margin account requirements to
limit speculation, a non-deceptive activity).
209. See H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 6-10 (1934), reprinted in 10 Legislative
History of The Securities Act of 1933 and The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, item no.
24, at 15-21 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) (delineating margin require-
ments, segregation of broker-dealer activities, and manipulative and deceptive practices).
210. See Thel, supra note 143, at 461.
211. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
212. IL (emphasis added). But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203
(1976) ("manipulative and cunning devices").
213. Hearings on H. 7852 and H. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (discussing § 9(c) of the Fletcher
Rayburn-Bill, which is identical to § 10(b)).
214. As with manipulation "cunning" has a variety of meanings. Cunning is defined as
"[a]bility, skill, or expertise; skill employed in a crafty manner, skillful deceit; craftiness;
guile; ... [e]xhibiting ingenuity; artfully subtle or shrewd; crafty; sly; guileful." Living
Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language 246 (1975). Whether, as in
the case of "manipulation," the Supreme Court will only consider "cunning" in the pejo-
rative sense is an open question.
215. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197, 199.
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Act, which deals with full disclosure in the underwriting of securities, to
the '34 Act.216 Although the '34 Act did include numerous disclosure
sections, it was also directed toward the effects of speculative trading.21 7
Some commentators have argued that simply because it was first, the '33
Act's philosophy has been carried over to the '34 Act.218
Moreover, the Court has carried over the definition of manipulation
from the language of Rule lOb-5. Rule lOb-5 was designed to defeat
fraudulent practices.219 But, it was promulgated under section 10(b) and
the Court has tended, when looking to manipulation, to define the statute
by using the rule.220
The Supreme Court's holdings in Santa Fe Industries v. Green22' and
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder222 seem to contradict the generally accepted
definition of manipulation in 1934. At the time, manipulation was seen
as the intentional creation of an artificial price.223 The issue of whether
the means were deceptive was not addressed. Congress, with the findings
of the Money Trust Investigation and the Hughes' Committee, focused
on the pricing impact of overt speculation. As the Hughes' Committee
regarded "gambling" to be dangerous, 224 and the Money Trust Investiga-
tion found speculation to deprive the market of its ability to correctly
evaluate security prices, 225 the '34 Act's drafters saw their essential mis-
sion as reducing the damage by speculators who sought "profits without
regard for the welfare of the exchange, other investors, or the economy as
a whole. 22 6 Congress set forth this goal in section 2 of the '34 Act.22
7
Moreover, as one court stated, "[t]he essential objective of securities leg-
islation is to protect those who do not know market conditions from the
overreaching of those who do."'228
216. See id. at 200.
217. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 3, at 129 (quoting Henry Morgenthau, Memoran-
dum on Conversation with Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Mar. 22, 1934), in Official Files
34, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers Box 2) (limiting speculation as a major goal of the '34
Act); see also H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 6, 7, 8, & 10 (1934), reprinted in 10
Legislative History of The Securities Act of 1933 and The Securities Exchange Act 1934,
item 24, at 15-21 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) (delineating margin
requirements, segregation of broker-dealer activities, and manipulative and deceptive
practices).
218. See Thel, supra note 143, at 415-16.
219. See Milton V. Freeman, Foreword, 61 Fordham L. Rev. S1 (1993).
220. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6 (1985); Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976).
221. 430 U.S. 462 (1977); see discussion supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
222. 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see discussion supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
223. See Dice, supra note 54, at 414.
224. See Hughes' Committee Report, supra note 184, at 4.
225. See Money Trust Investigation Report, supra note 184, at 46.
226. Id. at 111.
227. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
228. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943) (affirming the
SEC's revocation of a brokerage firm's license due to blatantly fraudulent activity); see
also 2 Charles H. Meyer, The Law of Stockbrokers and Stock Exchanges 34-35 (1936)
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III. PROGRAM TRADING AS MANIPULATIVE UNDER THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Under the Supreme Court's current definition of manipulation, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to find program trading manipula-
tiveperse. Individual users of program trading may use deceptive means
to manipulate the market, but the programs themselves are fairly
straightforward. Alternatively, program trading would likely be found
manipulative per se under a price-based theory of manipulation.
A. The SEC's Policy Grounds for Index Futures Contracts Are No
Longer Compelling
The first step in defining whether program trading is manipulative per
se is to analyze the policies behind the establishment of index futures
contracts. This is necessary because where a manipulative scheme is
found to have benefits for the market, the SEC has allowed a highly regu-
lated use of that scheme.229 The SEC's policy grounds for creating index
futures and options are no longer as compelling. As noted in Part I, the
SEC's primary reasons for accepting the creation of index futures-(i)
hedging opportunities for institutional investors; (ii) faster information
transfer; and (iii) price discovery-have not proven to be worthwhile.'3
The boon promised by index futures trading, the ability of portfolio
managers to hedge their positions, has proven to be a bust." The 1987
crash proved that managers' reliance on portfolio insurance was not
founded in reality."2 The number of portfolio mangers using index fu-
tures hedging has shrunk exponentially since the 1987 crash." 3
Also, the second of the SEC's policy grounds, the supposedly added
value of futures markets' faster reaction times to news and economic in-
formation has been questioned.2 34 The futures market's reactions nor-
mally only subtract minutes from the stock exchanges' reaction time."
These minutes do not make up for the vast swings caused by program
trading. Although the exchanges consider efficiency important, it is not
("One of the evils which the Securities Exchange Act was designed to prevent is the
manipulation of securities markets by practices which are deceptive or otherwise im-
proper.") (emphasis added).
229. See, eg., 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-8 (1992) (allowing the highly regulated use of stabi-
lizing bids in new issue aftermarkets); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7.
230. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
231. See Kurt Eichenwald, A Leaner But Not So Mean Wall St, N.Y. Tunes, Oct. 19,
1992, at D1.
232. See Harris, supra note 86, at 934 (misuse of portfolio insurance prevented the
hedge sought).
233. See idL; Eichenwald, supra note 231, at D1.
234. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 71, at 214 (questioning the value of the infor-
mation flow between the securities and futures markets given the illiquidity of the former
in comparison to the latter); see also Stout, supra note 29, at 631-32 (noting that two of
the SEC's defenses of index-related trading, faster transference of pricing information and
the ability to hedge positions are either de minimis are no longer viable).
235. See Stout, supra note 29, at 631.
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important enough to weaken the demand of individual investors for the
markets' services.
This leaves only the price discovery aspect of index-related trading as
the SEC's defense for the existence of inter-market efficiency. 236 Is price
discovery worth the disruptive effects of index-related trading?2 37 With
the hedgers, the most conservative part of the index futures market triad,
gone, the value of price discovery must be questioned as the futures mar-
ket suffers from radical intra-day price shifts.
B. Program Trading Under the Supreme Court's Current Definition of
Violations of Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b)
Using the three-pronged test for manipulation, as stated in section
9(a)(2) of the '34 Act, 238 program trading probably would not be consid-
ered manipulative. As noted earlier,239 there are three elements neces-
sary to prove manipulative practices under 9(a)(2): (i) effecting the
requisite series of transactions; (ii) creating an artificial price; and (iii)
showing a manipulative purpose.24
It is not clear whether program trading would satisfy the series of
transactions element. Manipulation cases generally look to single stock
transactions, not to broad market movements. 241 The main issue is
whether the simultaneous selling of stock and buying of futures would
meet the requirements of a series of transactions. There is, at this time,
no clear answer to this question, but, if it arose, it would be easy to prove
a series of transactions through order tickets and clearing house runs.
Some of the effects of index-related trading resemble the evidence re-
quired to show the creation of an artificial price, the second prong. The
collapse of the market after the program trading ends is very similar to
the circumstances relied upon in the early cases on manipulation.242
Often, after a series of programs has been executed, the market either
drops (after the increase from a buy program) or rises (after the drop
from a sell program).243 The programs overwhelm the normal supply or
demand for a stock and push prices beyond their natural level creating an
artificial price. 2" The market's collapse or rise, however, although indic-
236. See id. at 632.
237. See id.; see also Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of
Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1273, 1309
(1991) (noting the increases in the volatility of stock ownership).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1988).
239. See supra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988); 3 Loss, supra note 110, at 1550-51.
241. See In re Kidder Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559, 568 (1945).
242. See SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
243. See, e.g., Dave Pettit, Abreast of the Market: Industrials Decline 9.73 in Session
Dominated by Program Trading, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1992, at C2 (noting that "program
trading whipsawed prices throughout the session," but the market recovered from a
midafternoon deficit of 25 points); Stocks Turn Up; Dow Regains 1L23, N.Y. Times, June
20, 1992, § 1, at 38 (noting the quick recovery of the market after an expiration Friday).
244. See infra notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
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ative of foul play,2 45 has never alone sufficed to prove manipulation.' 6
Finally, program trading is not likely to satisfy the third element: ma-
nipulative purpose. As a result of the Supreme Court's holdings in Santa
Fe and Ernst, proof of the manipulative purpose must include the intent
to deceive. Simply profiting from a transaction is not enough; the courts
require that alleged manipulators have a separate pecuniary interest
(stake) in order to prove that a manipulative purpose exists. 47 Program
traders do have large financial stakes in the market's overall increase or
decrease before the trigger is pulled. In the instance that the trigger calls
for the purchase of securities and sale of futures or options, any increase
in the overall market decreases the particular trader's profitability. This
is so because the shift would make it costlier for the trader to lock in the
differentials. Thus, although a stake exists, it does not follow the usual
type seen by the courts. The courts look for stakes that will be enhanced
during or after the manipulative scheme is put into action.248 For exam-
ple, owners of options who manipulated the stock price to increase the
options' value, would sell or execute options after the stock price is
pushed up. On the other hand, as discussed above, the index arbi-
trageurs' sole stake in the market is before the program's execution.
Therefore, they do not benefit from the price swings caused by their pro-
gram trading.
Although there are certain aspects of program trading's impact on the
equities market that resemble the circumstantial evidence the courts rely
on to find manipulation, the intent to deceive appears to be lacking.
When index arbitrageurs complete their transactions and lock in the dif-
ferentials, they lose interest in future market activity because it does not
affect their profits.249 Therefore, the after-effects of program trading on
individual investors create no real pecuniary interest, as required under
section 9(a)(2), for the arbitrageur.
Although the impact of program trading has proven harmful to the
securities markets, the current definition of manipulation is not adequate.
The price-based definition of manipulation, however, could encompass
program trading.
C. Program Trading Under a Price-Based Theory of Manipulation
The last bastion for finding program trading manipulative relies on the
price-based theory of manipulation in effect at the time of the '34 Act's
writing and often used in commodities cases.250 Following the price-
245. See Resch, 362 F. Supp. at 978.
246. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
249. With the job completed, there is no need for further trading, unless the arbi-
trageur wants to trigger a new split between the derivative markets and the securities
markets. See Kerwin, supra note 74, at 38.
250. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
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based definition of manipulation-the intentional creation of artificial
prices-it becomes easier to characterize program trading as manipula-
tive per se. There are two ways to make the characterization-(i) the
effects of program trading on the stock exchanges and (ii) the new struc-
ture of the index futures markets.
1. The Effects of Program Trading on the Stock Exchanges
Commentators have noted that programs may be manipulative 251 in
that they create an artificial pricing structure that has the effect of driv-
ing securities prices either up or down.252 Essentially by overwhelming
the market with an increased supply of or demand for the securities un-
derlying the indices, program trading drives prospective investors from
the market, raising the inference of an artificial pricing structure.25 a Fur-
thermore, the actions of the arbitrageurs and portfolio insurers continue
to interfere with the normal actions and reactions of other investors. 254
251. See generally Thel, supra note 8, at 429 (the conduct of program traders is "essen-
tially the same as that prohibited or subjected to regulation under the heading of 'manip-
ulation' in sections 9(a)(2), 9(a)(6), 9(b), 9(c) and 10(a) of the Act . . [and] is fairly
characterized as manipulative, and accordingly section 10(b) should be understood to
forbid its use or employment").
252. See id.
253. For example, on March 24, 1992, an order clerk for Salomon erred and entered a
sell program for 11 million shares of stocks instead of $11 million worth of stocks in the
last minutes of trading. See William Power et a]., Clerk's Error Stirs Worry on Street:
SEC Vows Response; Big Board Presses For Trading Changes, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1992,
at Cl. The order, with an estimated value of $500 million, hit the NYSE hard. See
William Power & Craig Torres, Stocks Drop As Salomon Clerk Errs: Bungle Spurs Sell-
ing, Turning Dow's Gain Into 1.57-Point Loss, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1992, at Cl. The
error drove the DJIA from a 12 point gain to a loss in a matter of minutes. See id. As
one trader stated: "It happened in the last minute; the orders were peppered all over the
place.... There was no inkling of it; all of a sudden it came in at 3:58 and 3:59 and it just
rolled across the floor .... This was a misguided missile." Id.; see also Diana B. Hen-
riques, Similarities to 1987, & Significant Differences, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1991, at DI
(noting that index-related trading accounted for up to 16-25% of the markets loss);
Floyd Norris, Market Place: S.E.C.'s Analysis of Nov. 15 Plunge, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1992, at D8 (use of index-related trading strategies accelerated the market's 102 point
drop on Nov. 15, 1991); Dave Pettit, Abreast of the Market: Industrials Drop 10.27 in
Session Dominated by Program Trading, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1992, at C2 (noting the low
investor participation led to a greater-than-usual pricing impact by program trading);
Craig S. Smith, Abreast of the Market: Industrials End with Modest Gain; Program Trad-
ing Trims Early Rise, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1991, at C2 (noting that program trading's late
afternoon wave of orders overcame the weak resistance of buyers, forcing prices to
decline).
254. See, e.g., Dow Falls 6.22 in Light, Cautious Trading, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1992,
at D6 (reporting that investors were avoiding the market before the "triple witching");
Jonathan Fuerbringer, Stocks Fall as the Dow Loses 41.73, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1992, at
Dl (noting that securities buyers sat on the sideline until the expiration day trading had
passed, removing the much needed demand to support the market in the face of a sell-
off); Dow Down 15.79 on Olympia News, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1992, at A47 (index expira-
tion as a factor in markets loss).
Despite the questions raised by some economists, index-related trading has a strong
effect on the pricing structure of securities. See, e.g., Pickard & Axe, supra note 20, at 96-
97 (noting that, although both the volatility of the market and the velocity of securities
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Similarly, program trading can dominate the market. The Brady Re-
port found that at numerous periods during the week before the 1987
crash, index-related trading controlled twenty-nine percebt of the market
in the underlying securities during the last half hour of trading on Thurs-
day, October 15th,215 and fifteen percent during the last two hours on
Friday, October 16th.256 However attractive the theory of program trad-
ing as dominating the market is,2" 7 market domination is judged, in part,
by how long the alleged manipulator dominated the market. " Gener-
ally, the domination period is extended over weeks or months, not
hours.
25 9
The differing view of the injury requirement 2" may be dispositive and
may also explain why it may not be proper to require an element of de-
ownership turnover have increased dramatically since the introduction of index futures,
there is nothing "inherently wrong with index futures providing price discovery for the
stock market" even with the technical problems these futures cause); see also Hu, supra
note 237, at 1305 (claiming index-related transactions have led to an increased velocity in
the turnover of security ownership).
These facially artificial pricing structures certainly raise the inference of manipulation.
See Thel, supra note 8, at 428-29 (disruptive trading practices that effect stock prices,
although not deceptive, may be considered manipulative). But see Fischel & Ross, supra
note 174, at 505-07 (raising the specter of market manipulation in program trading, but
argues that manipulation should be abandoned and replaced by a fraud analysis). These
pricing fluctuations have had a profound effect on the securities industry.
255. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at 111-8.
256. See id. at 111-13. The SEC's study of the crash found that in 10 minute intervals
in the week before and during the crash, program selling had crossed the 50% barrier a
number of times. See SEC Crash Report, supra note 15, at 2-30 to 2-42. For example, on
October 6, the SEC had found that program selling was above the 60% mark for one 10
minute period and above 40% for three additional periods. See Id at 2-30. On October
16, program selling accounted for over 60% of the market in one period, and 50% in
another. See id.
257. See, eg., United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 371 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that defendant's control of 70% of the market for almost two hours was not sufficient
proof of manipulation).
258. The courts have recognized that the time necessary to dominate the securities
markets varies significantly with each case. See, eg., United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d
94, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1981) (one year period of domination), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946
(1982); United States v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844, 846-47 (2d Cir.) (four month period of
domination), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972). Butsee In re Delafield & Deladield, [1967-
69 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 77, 648, at 83,400 (SEC 1969) (unlike
Mulheren, a period of approximately two hours proved to be enough to be evidence ma-
nipulation). Note that the Mulheren Court distinguished Delafield by the defendant's use
of deceptive acts, particularly the use of fictitious names in purchasing the securities to
hide the true purchasers. See Mulheren, 938 F.2d at 371.
The Mulheren court restated the shibboleth that at the time a single order is executed,
the buyer makes up 100% of the demand for a security and the seller 100% of the supply
of the security. See id. Although this may be true, in Mulheren, the defendant had con-
stituted 70% of the market for over two hours, yet this was not enough in the eyes of the
Second Circuit.
For a general background of Mulheren, his relationship with Ivan Boesky, and his
weapons violation arrest, see James R. Stewart, Den of Thieves 232-34, 96-97, 100-01,
104-06, 171, 265, 428 (1991).
259. See cases cited supra note 258.
260. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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ception in manipulation cases. If the injury is to the market, why should
deceit be a factor? Regardless of deceit, the market is injured by manipu-
lation in that current and future investors will avoid participation be-
cause of what they perceive as a fixed game where only insiders and
sharp operators can win."'
Moreover, a price-oriented test is both workable and sensible.2 62 Mar-
ket manipulation is to be judged from a practical test.263 Because "[t]he
methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenu-
ity of man," 26 the requirement of deception may allow too many acts
which are injurious to the market to escape prohibition. 265 Although it
would not fulfill the Supreme Court's requirement of deception, manipu-
lation defined as "conduct [that] has been intentionally engaged in which
... result[s] in a price which does not reflect basic forces of supply and
demand ' 2 66 offers a more inclusive alternative.
Additionally, the aberrational effect on the market, both in the spiking
of prices and driving away of investors, certainly distorts the normal sup-
ply and demand for securities.2 67 This distorting effect has led individual
investors and congress to re-evaluate the securities markets, leaving
many individual investors with the sense that the game is rigged.268 Pro-
gram trading's effects have forced a number of the larger brokerage firms
to stop participating in the practice in order to restore investor confi-
261. See, eg., Greg Heberlein, Program Trading Erodes Market, Seattle Times, July
15, 1990, at El ("I completely missed the fundamental dynamic of some Wall Street
goons programming their computers to chisel a few bucks out of an inefficient system.").
262. See Markham, supra note 1, at 376-78.
263. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406
U.S. 932 (1972).
264. Id.
265. See Thel, supra note 8, at 429.
266. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1163.
267. See Thel, supra note 8, at 425-27.
268. See William J. O'Neil, How Program Trading Hurts Every Investor, Investor's
Daily, June 26, 1990, at 1 (analogizing program trading to a run-away car and asking,
"When will program traders demolish your stock market again and how bad will it be?");
see also Salomon Agrees to $1.3 Million Fine in Settling Charges it Cheated Clients, 23 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 111 (Jan. 25, 1991) (Salomon's altering of ticket prices and as-
signing the difference to its proprietary account was a lob-5 violation according to the
NYSE Stipulation of Charge); CBOE Member Firm Agrees to Huge Fine to Settle Im-
proper Trading Allegations, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 741 (May 11, 1990). Particu-
larly the futures and option segment of the program are susceptible to manipulation by
the traders on the floor of the exchange through improper trading schemes. See generally
Markham, supra note 1 (covering the history of manipulation in the commodities and
futures markets).
The general nature of commodities and futures trading has caused at least one public
director of an exchange to resign. See Thomas F. Eagleton, Chicago's Markets: Corrupt
to the Core, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989, at A31, ("The truth, regrettably, is that the
public cannot invest in the futures exchanges and be confident that it is getting a fair
deal."); Thomas Eagleton Resigns CME Post, Blasts Exchange, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1708 (Nov. 17, 1989) (Eagleton said in his resignation letter that he was "now
convinced that the public interest is not being well served at the Exchange").
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dence in the marketplace.269 Many of the major brokerage houses still
do not allow index arbitrage for their own accounts.27 ° For those inves-
tors who see program trading as dangerous to their equity holdings, and
see no way to protect themselves from that danger, the only escape is to
leave the market or invest in a mutual fund. Ironically, by leaving the
market, investors reduce the demand for securities and, in the end, make
the market-place less efficient and even more susceptible to manipulation.
2. The New Structure of the Index Futures Markets
Since the flight of the hedgers, speculators dominate the index futures
market.2 "1 This domination raises an additional inference of an artificial
pricing structure. Specifically, speculators rely on their expertise in pre-
dicting the stock market's future performance. 272 Using index futures as
betting tools, the speculators wager on the market. Moreover, purchases
of futures and options are, by their very natures, exceptionally risky fore-
casts of market performance.2 73 Consequently, the mechanism of pro-
gram trading appears subject to the self-fulfilling prophecies of the index
program and futures traders. At the market's low point during the 1987
Crash, hovering around 1700 points on the DJIA, the futures index was
predicting a drop to the 1400 point level-ultimately, a point never
reached.27 4 Thus, the ability of futures and options to accurately predict
future value is dubious.275
Furthermore, these derivatives are not based on the fundamental
269. See Stock Firms Are Ending Index Arbitrage, Urging NYSE to Restrict Program
Trading, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1627, (Nov. 3, 1989) (Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc. and Merrill Lynch & Co. cease all proprietary trading in index arbitrage); Four
Brokerage Houses to Cease Their Own Index-Arbitrage Trading, 20 Sec. Reg. L Rep. 725
(May 13, 1988) (Salomon Brothers, Morgan Stanley, PaineWebber, and Kidder Peabody
cease program trading).
270. See Hal Lux, Program Trading on Smaller Stocks May Get Midcap Boost, Invest-
ment Dealers' Digest, Feb. 17, 1992, at 8 (noting that some brokerage houses have re-
mained out of the program trading field for proprietary accounts).
271. See Harris, supra note 86, at 934; Solomon & Dicker, supra note 71, at 215; Stout,
supra note 29, at 613, 631-632; Eichenwald, supra note 231, at DI.
272. See e.g., Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 967 (2d Cir.
1987) ("Each [S&P 500 futures] contract... is a 'bet' on the future of the Standard &
Poor's 500 composite stock price index .... ); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Normally, the trader's expectation of
profit arises solely from speculative hope based upon his expertise in the market."), aff'd
456 U.S. 553 (1981); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311,
316 (S.D. Ohio 1979) ("[A] commodities future contract is little more than a wager that
the market price of a given commodity will change in a given direction by a specified
future date.").
273. See cases cited supra note 272.
274. See Brady Report, supra note 13, at 15.
275. See Solomon & Dicker, supra note 71, at 215. But see SEC Economist Defends
Role of Index Arbitrage, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 806 (May 27, 1988) (index arbi-
trage links the stock and stock index futures markets; "[lt carries information from one
market to another in response to price movements").
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worth of the underlying securities.27 6 As a result, the unrepresentative
wagers of the futures contracts traders are transferred from the futures
exchanges to the stock exchanges through the index arbitrage mecha-
nism. This transfer disrupts the normal valuation of security prices and
creates an artificial price. Donald Regan, the former White House Chief
of Staff, Treasury Secretary, and CEO of Merrill Lynch, testified before
the House, that program trading is a "false thing," that causes instability
in the equities markets.277
Additionally, the structure of the securities markets is more diverse
than the index futures markets. At best the index futures markets have
three tiers, but securities exchanges have greater depth in their investor
pool. There is not only speculation on the NYSE, but also long term
investment, as well as several shades of each in between. Consequently,
index arbitrage's price levelling merely transfers the bets of speculators to
a market that is not made up solely of speculators. The cost of index
arbitrage is too high for the equity markets to bear.
There have been calls to ban index arbitrage because of its effects on
the stock exchanges.278 Without the overriding public policy that once
existed, perhaps it is time to reevaluate whether, under the original intent
of the '34 Act, program trading should be defined as manipulative per se
and hence banned.
CONCLUSION
Strictly following the Supreme Court's definition of manipulation in
Santa Fe and Ernst, program trading is not manipulative per se. 2 79 How-
ever, in light of the '34 Act's impetus and section 10(b)'s broad language,
a price-based theory of manipulation may be preferable to the Court's
misconstrued definition. The '34 Act was created to prevent the misuse
of the marketplace by speculators and sharp operators. Whether the
speculators used deceptive devices was not the only issue, rather it was
the effects of speculative activity that the '34 Act sought to prevent.
A price-based theory of manipulation, defined as any act that severely
disrupts the market's pricing structure, is closer to the intent of Congress
as expressed in the '34 Act than the Court's current definition. Under a
price-based theory of manipulation, program trading would be manipula-
tiveper se. Program trading overwhelms the natural supply and demand
for securities. Furthermore, it transfers the bets of futures speculators to
a more diverse market and has chased individual investors from the stock
276. See Weiner, supra note 18, at 5, 108-10 (the goal of indexing is to remove or to
take advantage of market risk; market risk is a macroeconomic feature and not one deter-
mined by the microeconomic factors that affect the individual stocks).
277. See Regan calls for Banning Index Arbitrage as First Reform, 20 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 723 (May 13, 1988).
278. See id.
279. Or as one over-the-counter trader told me, "it [stinks] but it ain't illegal."
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exchanges, making the securities markets more susceptible to
manipulation.
The prohibition of program trading will likely create a better market-
place for securities. Consumers would be more comfortable investing in-
dividually in a securities market free from artificially created price sw-
ings. The rebirth of individual investor interest would create more
demand for the markets' services. Moreover, the market will be freed of
the taint, similar to that which existed in the 1920s, that it is only suita-
ble for those with the power and money to buy their way into the inner
circle of computer trading. Consequently, the market-place would be
fairer and more efficient.

